AUKUS is a security and defense partnership between the US, UK, and Australia that was signed in September 2021. This defense partnership’s pivotal focus is ‘the development of joint capabilities and technology sharing and deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains.’ At the heart of the deal, the partnership provides nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by the US and UK. Hence, the partnership plays a role in spreading nuclear technology from nuclear weapon states to non-nuclear weapon states. By virtue of the AUKUS deal, Australia will be the first non-nuclear weapon state to acquire nuclear reactors to power submarines, while only 7 out of 9 nuclear weapon states have this nuclear technology.
This trilateral treaty, for power maximization to contain China in the Asia Pacific, entails the presence of the US and UK in the region, but the partnership poses grave consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that obligates the state parties to abide by the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, while Australia will be exercising a loophole of the IAEA safeguards that not only creates space for nuclear proliferation but sets a very damaging precedent for states that may aspire to follow suit.
The great bargain of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear states is the standard of nuclear non-proliferation and then the inalienable right to peaceful nuclear activities for the non-nuclear weapon states. The NPT’s (Nuclear Proliferation Treaty) Article III requires the state parties (the non-nuclear weapon states) to accept the safeguards as set forth by the IAEA for verification and inspection purposes, so the state parties would declare their nuclear material and would not divert its usage to weapon acquisition.
To ensure that nuclear energy’s use is not diverted to weapons’ use, Australia has a Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Commission. Under the AUKUS, the submarines Australia would acquire would be nuclear-powered submarines armed with conventional weapons. However, the nuclear propulsion of the nuclear submarines does not fall under peaceful use but is a non-explosive military use of nuclear energy. The reason for nuclear propulsion being a non-explosive military use is the usage of HEU or LEU that may be enriched further to become weapon-grade enriched uranium, thereby being a threat to nuclear proliferation.
Article 14 of the INFcirc-153 is a mechanism under which Australia, a CSA state, can make arrangements with the IAEA that the nuclear material may be removed from the safeguards for non-peaceful activities or non-proscribed military activity while notifying the composition and amount of the material and the intention of the nuclear material’s usage. The transfer of nuclear submarines appears to be a military-to-military transfer, while the application of Article 14 is an unknown territory as no state has ever triggered its application and it has never been tested by the IAEA Board of Governors or in NPT review conferences. Therein, the verification and inspection of the use of nuclear energy will be difficult. Only assurance needs to be provided to the IAEA related to the non-diversion of nuclear use while concealing the transfer of information that might be related to proliferation.
The construction or operation of nuclear-powered submarines by non-nuclear-weapon states is not prohibited by the NPT. But the IAEA is unable to protect naval reactors for pragmatic reasons, as the location of the submarines and their naval reactors is needed to remain covert. Therefore, for use in naval reactors or other “non-proscribed military activity,” non-nuclear-weapon states are allowed to remove nuclear material from safeguards under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. There is an obvious and concerning weakness in the IAEA safeguards. However, only nuclear-weapon states and non-NPT signatories have used naval reactors up until this point. Therefore, no non-nuclear-weapon state has ever used this loophole since the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement was first drafted nearly fifty years ago.
Any innovation that makes it possible for non-nuclear-armed states to get nuclear weapons while posing as compliant will inevitably undermine the treaty’s credibility. In essence, Article III of the NPT requires non-nuclear weapon states to adhere to procedures set up in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to stop the divergence of nuclear energy resources from being used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Article III, paragraph 2, further mandates that states not transfer technology to any other state for the purpose of producing, using, processing, or using any particular fissionable material or the substance itself.
By establishing a new category of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) with significant amounts of weapon-grade nuclear material outside of NPT safeguards, the exclusion described in paragraph 14 of the INFCIRC/153 is undesirable and undermines the goals and purposes of NPT safeguards. It also adds another layer of discrimination to the existing distinction between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. In addition, the double standards of the “nuclear haves” will set a damaging precedent for would-be proliferators in the future. Any non-nuclear weapon state might remove their nuclear material in naval reactors from inspection by the IAEA and then covertly divert its usage towards developing nuclear weapons. While Australia received no or little backlash for these designs, if any potential adversary of the US exploits the same loophole and is resisted by the US, it would be seen as a double standard in the international arena.
There’s a great chance that, even with all of their might, Australia and the IAEA won’t be able to save the NPT regime from harm if the program is carried out. If another country were to follow Australia’s lead and figure out how to divert materials for nuclear weapons, it may have disastrous consequences not only for the regime but also for the safety of nuclear weapons worldwide, a subject that China and Indonesia have brought up recently. This may potentially be disastrous for the entire world and pose an indirect threat to Australia. It is crucial that Australia pursue national security without unintentionally jeopardizing the international order that the AUKUS partners are working to maintain or the global security afforded by the NPT framework.
Independent Researcher
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