The first Nuclear Age (1945-1990) was marked by nuclear arms racing and a threat of nuclear conflict between two superpowers in a bipolar world while the second Nuclear Age (1990) was marked by the concerns posed by different nuclear actors in the world in a unipolar world but with the emergence of hypersonic and laser weapons and the adoption of other EDTs into military applications, the world is entered into the “Third Nuclear Age,” which is marked by the challenges of new technology military capabilities and the risk of nuclear escalation in a highly tensed multipolar environment.
In the wake of the Third Nuclear Age, the challenges shifted from proliferation concerns to new technology, military capabilities, and nuclear escalation risks in a highly tense nuclear environment. The recent developments and modernization in strategic non-nuclear weapons highlight the concerns regarding the vulnerability of nuclear assets. Besides modernization, the nuclear and conventional forces assets are linked with each other to a dangerous extent, as many C-31 assets become dual-use today. An attack on C-31 assets with conventional military goals could be misinterpreted and could escalate into a nuclear war. The US mentioned clearly in its Nuclear Posture Review 2018 that it will respond with nuclear to any non-nuclear attacks on its early warning system (c-31 assets). The conflict can escalate to nuclear due to misinterpreted warning or damage limitation doctrine. There is a need to address the Dual Use Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Assets’ dilemma and arms control agreements, which can be done through an incremental approach alongside the CBMs.
What C-31 assets are? C-31 assets include satellites used for early warning, communication, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); ground-based radars and transmitters; and communication aircraft. Such assets constitute key nodes in states’ nuclear C-31 systems but they become entangled with non-nuclear weapons as they become dual-use, meaning they are used both for nuclear and non-nuclear operations.
Nuclear conventional entanglement
Nuclear conventional entanglement is a contemporary issue of this new nuclear age and the increasing entanglement of nuclear and conventional forces has become a critical issue in Sino-US relations, significantly heightening the risk of conflict escalation. This entanglement blurs the lines between nuclear and non-nuclear assets, making it difficult to distinguish between conventional and nuclear threats during a crisis. In the context of Sino-US relations, this ambiguity can lead to misperceptions and miscalculations, where actions perceived as conventional could be interpreted as preparations for a nuclear strike.
Here a question arises: What’s the problem? And how has the increasing entanglement of nuclear and conventional forces become a critical issue in Sino-US relations, significantly heightening the risk of conflict escalation?
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has become reliant on dual-use C31 assets. The US dismantled various nuclear-only communication systems, such as Emergency Rocket Communications Systems and Survivable Low Frequency Communications Systems, in the 1990s. The C31 assets deployed solely for nuclear operations have become dual use and today Milstar and AEHF satellites represent the United States’ most secure space-based means of communicating with both nuclear and “high priority” nonnuclear users. On the other hand, Beijing has also become extensively reliant on C31 assets’ dual-used abilities for nuclear and non-nuclear operations and its recent deployment ofDF-26 ballistics highlights the concern. During a conflict, an attack on assets with conventional military goals could be misinterpreted and could escalate into a nuclear war. The situation has become so tense that even incidental attacks have the potential to spark a nuclear war. In the situation of a conventional non-nuclear war between the US and China, attacks on dual-used C-31 assets make it hard to interpret the intentions of the adversary, leading to a misinterpreted warning crisis that will put the lives of billions of people at risk.
We get to know the problem but we can tackle this issue by addressing the Dual Use Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Assets’ Dilemma and an incremental approach to secure new Arms Control agreements between them.
Addressing the Dual Use Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Assets’ Dilemma
To mitigate the effects of conventional nuclear entanglement between the US and China, there is a need to separate the C31 assets both for nuclear and non-nuclear operations. But besides their separation, a clear challenge lies ahead of separating nuclear and non-nuclear C3I systems, which lies in the dual-use nature of certain technologies, such as early warning systems that detect both nuclear and conventional attacks. The goal is to mitigate the effects of these dual-use systems by addressing the dual-use nuclear and non-nuclear asset dilemma.
Developing a Specialized Detection System: Deploy separate early warning systems with one set focused entirely on detecting nuclear threats and another on conventional threats.
Clear Operational Boundaries: Define clear operational boundaries for any remaining dual-use systems. The operational boundaries might include how (highlight or outline what type of signals will be transmitted through such satellites in non-crisis situations so that any sudden change in usage pattern doesn’t heighten tensions between the adversaries) and when (specify that the specific satellite will only be used for nuclear communications during a declared nuclear alert or crisis) they will be used, with mutual agreements to reduce the risk of misinterpretation.
Also add the mechanisms where both sides can monitor or verify that the satellite is being used according to the agreed boundaries, perhaps through shared data or third-party oversight. In essence, these operational boundaries are about creating predictability and trust, ensuring that the use of dual-use systems does not inadvertently escalate a conflict into a nuclear crisis. This approach will be resource-intensive as significant investment in infrastructure and technology is required to ensure clear distinctions between the two types of forces, which can be both costly and technically challenging. Further, it might create potential gaps in deterrence as adversaries might perceive a reduced threat from conventional forces that are no longer linked to nuclear capabilities.
However, the aforementioned challenges can be tackled by the aforementioned recommendations. In the end, the benefits can outweigh these challenges because clear separation can minimize the risk of misinterpretations and unintended escalation, ultimately improving crisis stability.
Arms Control Agreements: Need for an Incremental Approach
To mitigate the effects of conventional nuclear entanglement between the US and China, there is a need to sign the arms control agreements between both states but this comes with several challenges. The strategic competition between them in the Indo-Pacific and the lack of transparency between the two countries make it difficult to establish the trust necessary for meaningful arms control agreements. To tackle these challenges, there is a need to develop mutual trust among them.
The US has pushed China to join arms control negotiations, particularly over nuclear weapons but China’s reluctance exaggerates the existing tensions and complicates the efforts to reduce the risk of miscommunications. To bring China to the table, the US instead of pushing for full-scale disarmament talks could propose incremental steps. This could include a discussion on limiting the use and deployment of destabilizing technologies such as hypersonic missiles or cyber capabilities that target nuclear command-and-control systems.
But besides this, a challenge lies ahead of building mutual trust through the CBMs because mutual interest is crucial for framing arms control efforts as a way to reduce these entanglement risks so that both sides can find common ground. The following CBMs can lead to the buildup of mutual trust among the adversaries:
Mutual Communication Hotlines: Establish dedicated communication channels between U.S. and Chinese military and political leaders specifically for crises with the established protocols for usage during high-tension scenarios and regular tests to ensure functionality.
Notification of Military Exercises: Advance notification of large-scale military exercises and missile tests that could be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack by highlighting the timing and nature of the exercises, with the potential for observation or participation by the other side’s representatives to increase transparency through exchange of military observers.
Satellite Image Sharing: The U.S. and China would share specific satellite images with each other. These images could show military bases, missile sites, or other important areas to prove that neither side is getting ready for war or using equipment that could be mistaken as a threat. Both sides would agree on what type of images could be shared, under what conditions, and how this information can be used.
Joint Working Groups: Establishment of joint working groups to address the risks of cyber operations and others targeting C3I assets.
The U.S. and China have engaged in various strategic dialogues over the years, such as the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and the U.S.-China Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD). These dialogues should lead to formal arms control agreements, which are only possible by establishing risk reduction teams within the military establishment, which must be bureaucratically empowered. These efforts will lead to a stable and healthy relationship between the US and China.
The issue of conventional-nuclear entanglement is of dire importance and complex and requires efforts from stakeholders on both sides. Both sides should try to address the challenge from the aforementioned recommendations to save the world from unintended nuclear conflict.
The Author, Muhammad Hussnain Qaiser is an International Relations and Politics student, currently serving as Vice President of the Society of International Affairs. He has experience working with ISPR and CSSPR, with research focused on strategic stability in nuclear environments.
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