The Russia-Ukraine conflict and climate change are driving a “nuclear renaissance” in both military and civil arenas. The world is vying to turn green by using nuclear energy as an alternative to fossil sources. In the opposite parallel, the nuclear weapon club as a whole is flexing its muscles either by upgrading or incorporating new and emerging systems into nuclear weapons programs. The worrying trend mentioned in recent publications from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) finds that the best-known nuclear weapons states, the US, Russia, China, and India, are building more warheads while also deploying a larger number of missiles to high-alert states.
This increases the probability of a nuclear escalation, as this will reduce any time for diplomatic engagement for war prevention. . Putting others aside, I will delve only into the objectives, motivation, and consequences of India’s nuclear escalation. SIPRI reports that India’s nuclear arsenal now stands at 172 warheads, up from 164. This is a modest but noteworthy rise. This boost is primarily intended to counter China’s expanding nuclear arsenal. But looking at this only from the perspective of deterrence against China leaves out worth noting insights, objectives, and implication.
With the development of new military technology and increasing stocks at a rapid pace, India runs the risk of losing credibility with its nuclear doctrine, which places a strong emphasis on Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD) and No First Use (NFU). For neighboring states, these growing nuclear arsenals bring a new level of unease. If this pattern continues, Pakistan’s capacity to exercise deterrence will be put to the test. Even if it is only a slight increase, the current trend is noteworthy, and it is likely to continue.
These developments by India strengthen Paksitan’s position on FMCT. Pakistan has long claimed that it supports FMCT, but with its current stockpile, India is already in a clear advantageous position, and hence the treaty should consider existing stocks because only in this way will it become a cutoff treaty. Also, it has persistently raised doubts over the Indo-US nuclear deal, stating that it will destabilize the region and provide India with much more infrastructure for its nuclear program. This deal, which enabled nuclear technology and materials to flow into India over the next several years, is especially crucial in this context. Although the agreement was meant to bring India into line with the international nonproliferation framework by convincing it to include IAEA safeguards and verification in more facilities, it has unintentionally led to India’s nuclear build-up.
The agreement has given India the chance to use imported fuel for civilian purposes while directing more of its domestic resources toward military nuclear programs. This development, however, has expanded India’s stockpile and casts doubt on the efficacy of international treaties to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and maintain regional security. The US-India nuclear deal was a blunt opposition to the NPT. With eight unguarded reactors to back it up, India’s growing arsenal might tip the strategic balance in South Asia, undermining regional deterrence and making Pakistan’s concerns legitimate.
The bilateral security scenario is made more complex by the induction of emerging technologies like ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) by India. A growing number of warheads can encourage a first-use strategy that aims to proactively neutralize an adversary’s nuclear capabilities with a large number of warheads and utilize BMD to limit potential retaliation strikes. The counter-force strategy, albeit not formally documented by India, could be used in a crisis situation, directly undermining India’s NFU doctrine and destabilizing the area while also weakening India’s credibility as a responsible nuclear power.
India now has more nuclear warheads than Pakistan for the first time in twenty-five years. If this trend persists, it will create concerns around the world, possibly even among major powers in the future. India’s inspiration is now toward a more global outlook, moving away from the region alone. The US and other world powers may ignore these developments at the moment due to their friendly and strategic ties with India, but the dynamic nature of international relations may eventually provide challenges or threats to them. Global nonproliferation and disarmament norms are also impacted by the increased focus on nuclear capabilities by India and other nuclear states.
Beyond the immediate concerns of the region, India’s burgeoning nuclear program has wider consequences. This development calls into question international efforts towards nonproliferation from a larger perspective. The world community is currently faced with a challenging and potentially unstable scenario, despite its long-standing efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals and advance disarmament. India’s increasing nuclear capabilities might undermine decades of nonproliferation efforts by creating a precedent that other countries, particularly Pakistan, would be compelled to follow.
This approach to enhancing nuclear forces is mostly driven by nationalism and Modi’s strategy of outmatching Pakistan, which repeats the pattern of watching nukes as Pride Bombs did likewise earlier in 1974 and adds yet another layer to the complicated reasons behind India’s nuclear expansion. Beyond achieving strategic goals, boosting India’s nuclear weapons also advances domestic politics by apeasing the masses. Shortly after the elections, the media began to depict the SIPRI report’s findings as an item of national pride. As Modi was assembling a coalition government, this new development increased Modi’s popularity among the general public.
The Indian populace has historically welcomed such developments, and such developments usually strengthen nationalist feelings and gain political support for the governing party. The public’s emotions are already subscribed to Prime Minister Modi’s emphasis on maintaining a strong defensive posture and his dedication to updating India’s military infrastructure, which now incorporates the nuclear buildup into his administration’s policy. Furthermore, this nuclear buildup signifies India’s inspiration as a global power. India wants to show that it is a global power, not a regional hegemon, and can influence worldwide affairs on a larger scale by amassing more nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. This change in approach might bring about a paradigm shift in international security.
Another element in the calculus for regional security is Pakistan’s response to India’s nuclear buildup. Pakistan has always viewed its nuclear weapons as the only counterweight to India’s conventional military superiority. Now, with this advancement of the nuclear program in India, Pakistan would have to follow suit in a way that will not only maintain deterrence between two antagonists but also counteract the superior numerical and technological Indian superiority with respect to its own force. This “tit-for-tat” pattern could then lead to a nuclear arms race as well as mounting regional tensions.
To prevent a new nuclear arms race and maintain peace and security in the region, the international community needs to acknowledge and respond to these changing dynamics. There’s a need for bilateral agreements and engagement to curb this new rise. The necessity for arms control initiatives and confidence-building measures is greater than ever as a result of this intensifying competition.
Qamar Shahzad is a student of International Relations with a profound interest in nuclear security and strategy in South Asia. He frequently writes on topics such as nuclear deterrence, the arms race, and nuclear politics.His contributions have been published by South Asian Voices and The Friday Times, highlighting his expertise in the field.
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