Freshwater resources are critical to economic stability, food security, and sustainable development in South Asia and are becoming increasingly available and increasingly managed. It includes a whopping 200 million people—roughly one quarter of the world’s population—yet possesses only 4 percent of the world’s freshwater resources, leaving water management in this region absolutely critical to regional security. In South Asia, at the centre of water governance is the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which World Bank brokered between India and Pakistan in 1960. Long viewed as a model for transboundary water diplomacy, the IWT has sustained cooperation between two nuclear armed nations despite infrequent geopolitical tensions. But the costly impacts of climate change and growing water scarcity demand we revisit the treaty to make sure it’s relevant and effective in our time.
The Genesis of the Indus Waters Treaty
In 1947 the partition of British India led to the creation of the states of India and Pakistan and the division of the lifeblood of millions in the Indus River Basin, a 1.12 million square kilometre expanse of river that extends from Tibetan Plateau in China to the Arabian Sea. The Indian upper riparian state captured control of the headwaters of the Indus River as well as its tributaries and left the smaller Pakistan as the lower riparian state, critically dependent on the Indus system for agriculture and drinking water. Almost immediately after partition, disputes over water sharing flared up, and soon India stopped sending water to Pakistan by closing its water channels in April 1948.
The World Bank meddled in the stalemate and mediated the way to signing the IWT in 1960. Under the treaty, India obtained the rights over the three eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas and Sutlej while Pakistan received the more important three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. India was allowed to continue to use the rivers for purposes other than consumptive use – such as hydropower generation or navigation – so long as it did not cause blockage of flow to Pakistan.
In six decades, IWT has been living in peace, which is war and military conflict between the two countries. The successful management of transboundary waters in a conflict prone region has been lauded as a rare example of transboundary water governance. But its hard and fast framework, set in another era, is under severe pressure from climate change and water needs by both nations.
Climate Change and the Indus Basin
Because of the impacts of climate change, the Indus Basin is highly vulnerable and threatens far reaching consequences for water availability and regional security. Glacial melt is one of the most pressing challenges. Alarming is how fast the ice in the Himalayas, known as the ‘Third Pole,’ is melting. Between 1980 and now, the Upper Indus Basin has lost 23 percent of its glaciers, of which another 50 percent will likely disappear by the end of the century. At first, the melting contributes to increased river flow, but eventually the water is in short supply for agriculture, for drinking or for hydropower.
Water variability is exacerbated by erratic monsoon patterns. Rainfall intensity and timing have changed resulting in flooding and drought. For example, Government reports indicate that over 18 million people have been ravaged by the deluge. Economic losses from the floods were estimated by the Pakistani government at $43 billion. Prime Minister Gillani said the floods will see the country’s economic growth fall by 2 percent. But droughts have also severely hit agricultural output, especially in water stressed regions such as Sindh and Rajasthan. Adding to these challenges is the growing temperatures and rising evaporation rates that follow.
Hydro-Politics and Rising Tensions
The IWT has traditionally been able to deescalate water related disputes, however, the IWT’s limitations are becoming more and more apparent in the context of changing environmental and geopolitical realities. India has built dams and dam projects on the western rivers and Pakistan has been worried about that, particularly the Kishanganga and Baglihar projects. Pakistan says these projects have violated the treaty by causing a reduction in downstream flows that affect agriculture and energy security in the country.
India, however, claims that these projects fall within the treaty’s provisions, which permit non consumptive use of the western rivers. Further, the lack of mechanisms in the IWT to deal with climate induced variability in water flows has only strained relations. And there’s no transparency or sharing of data between the two nations, aggressively fuelling mistrust and halting joint solutions.
The competition over water between India and Pakistan takes another dimension. Water has become a strategic issue that is closely entangled with other aspects relating to total region and peace such as the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. And as upstream infrastructure development continues and water scarcity intensifies, disputes are not likely to diminish, but instead the potential for disputes to escalate into larger conflicts grows.
The Role of Environmental Security
The Pakistan-India water dispute has come to be viewed through the lens of environmental security — the study of the relationships between ecological health and regional stability. Climate change is a ‘threat multiplier’ increasing the number of other threats and existing vulnerabilities. For example, changes in hydrological climate threaten both countries’ food and energy security and the likelihood of social and political unrest is heightened.
As it is currently designed, the IWT does not adequately deal with environmental change, or with adaptive management. Despite their broadly uncooperative approach to water management, both countries have pursued national interests rather than regional cooperation. The fragmented approach undermines the possibility for a coordinated collective action to address common risks.
Revisiting the Indus Waters Treaty
To adapt the IWT for present day challenges, a multi faceted approach of incorporating climate resilience, strengthening data sharing mechanisms and promoting greater regional cooperation should be employed.
Climate-Resilient Infrastructure
Both India and Pakistan should invest in infrastructure that is climate variable. Extreme weather events can be mitigated, and water security improved through flood control systems, drought resistant crops and more effective irrigation technologies.
Data Sharing and Early Warning Systems
It is important to have a solid data sharing mechanism between the two nations. A real time monitoring of river flows and glacial melt and rainfall patterns for example can improve decision making, increase trust and decrease mistrust. A shared hydrological database could be administered by the Permanent Indus Commission.
A Nexus Approach
Sustainable water management requires recognition of water energy and food security interdependence. By developing joint projects on renewable energy like a solar or wind farm, such dependence on hydropower could be alleviated.
Third-Party Mediation and Regional Cooperation
The World Bank or the United Nations could be neutral mediators to discuss updating the treaty so it could tackle climate change. Local meetings like the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can also help the countries participate in a wider collaboration to water and climate issues.
Towards a Sustainable Future
The Indus Waters Treaty is testament to the way in which co-operation is possible in a region where enmities run deep. Yet its capacity to secure equitable and sustainable water management in response to 21st century challenges is under increasing question. For the future of the Indus Basin, the treaty needs to be strengthened by providing for more integrated water governance, by building trust through greater transparency, and by allowing greater emphasis on an integrated approach.
Climate change is a crisis and an opportunity. It forces India and Pakistan to admit to their common vulnerabilities and look for common solutions together. The stakes are higher than ever, as so many people depend on the equitable management of the Indus River system for their livelihoods. To take forward, we need visionary leadership, innovative diplomacy and a commitment to building resilience against a rapidly changing climate.
Looking at the Indus Waters Treaty in these terms, it should not be read as a rollback to traditional water bargaining, but instead as a potential ground for developing a more adaptable and more inclusive architecture of water diplomacy. In an era of unprecedented environmental uncertainty, South Asia can begin to address the twin challenges of climate change and geopolitical rivalry by treating transboundary water cooperation as a global model for cooperation.
The Author, Muhammad Ibrahim is an independent researcher and analyst. His expertise lies in analyzing foreign policy and its implications on global politics.
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